We analyze the impact of minimum quality standards (MQS) imposed at the discretion of producers acting collectively under the auspices of a producer organization, such as a marketing order. MQS enacted in a competitive market can never enhance social welfare because in general a MQS creates two deadweight losses-one due to inefficient enhancement of product quality and a second due to wastage of the low-quality product. The distributional effects of a MQS are important as well. Any MQS that a competitive industry implements based upon a profit criterion causes all consumers in the market to be harmed. However, a MQS may be preferred relative to a volume-control policy as a second-best instrument to transfer income to producers.
Impacts of Minimum Quality Standards Imposed Through Marketing Orders or Related Producer Organizations
The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act (AMAA) of 1937 and subsequent amendments to it grant U.S. farmers the discretion to form producer organizations known as marketing orders and implement collective programs to undertake production and processing research and product promotion, utilize supply-management practices, impose minimum quality standards (MQS), and conduct inspections. State laws enacted around the same time as the AMAA provide state-level authority to conduct many of the same activities.
The various functions that can be performed under the auspices of marketing orders have attracted considerable research interest. Volume-control programs have always been widely controversial and a focus of research (Stokdyk 1933; Wellman 1935; Jesse 1979; Dunn and Heien 1982; Lenard and Mazur 1985; Alston et al. 1995; Crespi and Chacon-Cascante 2004) , even though relatively few marketing orders have authorized this provision and even fewer actively utilize it (Lee et al. 1996) .
1
Compared to direct volume controls, MQS have been implemented extensively. Of the 31 current federal orders, 29 have some combination of grade, size, quality, or maturity provisions authorized or in effect (USDA 2007) . 2 However, the MQS provision of marketing order legislation has received relatively little attention despite the comparative frequency of its authorization and utilization. The first discussions of MQS depicted them as simply a "hidden" or indirect form of volume control (e.g., Wellman 1935) , a characterization that persists to this day (e.g., Carman 2007; Lence et al. 2007 ), including in policy settings (e.g., U.S. Department of Justice 1993 . Other 1 The generic promotion provision of marketing orders has also been studied extensively. Kaiser et al. (2005) provide a recent summary of much of this work. 2 Twenty five federal marketing orders have minimum grade standards in place, 25 have size regulations authorized or in effect, and 3 have general "quality" regulations in effect. State orders also can impose MQS. For example, eight California marketing programs have regulations regarding quality standards and inspection (Lee et al. 1996) .
authors (e.g., Shafer 1968; Jesse 1979) have posited a benefit to MQS related, implicitly, to the mitigation of asymmetric information. They assumed that a MQS would increase the average quality of the product on the market, thereby increasing overall demand for it. These studies have yielded ambiguous results because the impact of a MQS depends upon assumed values for the price elasticities of the supply and demand functions and the size of the shift in demand induced by the MQS. Bockstael (1984) recognized the fundamental difficulty in using a single demand function to model products with heterogeneous quality. In her model products of different qualities have unique but interrelated supply and demand functions. She showed that when consumers have perfect information about product quality and value differences in quality, the imposition of MQS reduces both consumer and net welfare whenever a MQS causes price of the high-quality product to rise.
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This paper extends Bockstael's work in various directions. The goal is to analyze the impacts of MQS imposed by producer organizations in a model that incorporates vertical product differentiation in consumer demand, the key characteristics of agricultural production, and the endogenous nature of the adoption decision of MQS imposed by producer organizations. 4 Although we frame our analysis in the context of U.S. federal and state marketing orders, results apply broadly to producer organizations elsewhere that have been granted or could be granted similar authority to implement MQS. A key example is the protected designations of origin (PDO) in Europe (Zago 3 A subsequent contribution by Chambers and Pick (1994) focuses on the role of MQS in an international trade setting.
The AMAA was amended in 1954 to include section 8e, which allows domestic producers to require importers to comply with the same standards and regulations imposed in the domestic market. Employing a multi-product general equilibrium modeling framework in a bilateral trade setting, they showed that imposition of MQS by one country in a free-trade environment can act as a non-tariff trade barrier and reduce the net social welfare of at least one of the countries, if not both. 4 No prior work has considered the adoption decision under a producer optimization condition, as applies in most agricultural contexts. Imposition of the MQS is exogenous in the majority of articles surveyed. Noted exceptions are Ecchia and Lambertini (1997) who impose a MQS based upon a criterion of welfare maximization, and Marette (2007) and Marette, Bureau, and Gozlan (2000) who consider the provision of product safety in a perfect-information environment.
1999), and, more generally, organizations supporting what Lence et al. (2007) call geographically differentiated agricultural products (GDAP). Because these organizations have the authority to define the characteristics of products produced under their auspices, they have the functional power to specify MQS.
Instead of the general compensated demand functions used by Bockstael, we adopt the MussaRosen (1978) specification of consumer preferences to allow a precise representation of the interaction between different quality levels in the market place, 5 and specify the supply side of the market in a simple manner that is consistent with key facets of agricultural production. The technological specification involves exogenous total production and ex ante distributions for highand low-quality production, but we allow the ex ante distribution of production to be altered through costly "transformation" of low-quality (L) product to high quality (H).
To study the MQS-adoption decision, the model unfolds in two stages. The industry chooses in stage 1 whether or not to impose a MQS based upon an industry profit-maximization criterion in rational anticipation of the effect a MQS will have on industry behavior. Although the decision whether to impose a MQS is made collectively, production decisions are made in stage 2 by individual producers who act as perfect competitors. 6 Because the product attributes regulated by marketing programs are often visible, e.g., size, color, blemishes, or other cosmetic defects, or discernable at low cost through testing, e.g., percent damage due to pests (Starbird 1994), and, 5 Various general studies on MQS have also have utilized models with the demand side of the market characterized by Mussa-Rosen (1978) type preferences. The supply side in these studies is generally characterized by duopoly competition taking place in two stages, first in choice of a single quality level to produce and then in choice of price, given quality levels (e.g., Ronnen 1991; Crampes and Hollander 1995; Maxwell 1998) . The assumptions of endogenous quality levels and duopoly competition cause this work to have little direct application to MQS imposed in agricultural industries. 6 This specification is consistent with the observation that many producer organizations have authority to impose MQS but do not exercise volume control. Lence et al. (2007) confirm this by recognizing that the United States, unlike Europe, generally does not allow producer organizations to implement acreage restrictions or price controls. The case where both the decision to implement a MQS and determine production volumes is under industry control is analyzed by Saitone (2008) .
hence, observable to consumers or intermediary buyers, we retain the perfect information assumption utilized by the more recent papers on MQS in agricultural industries, such as Bockstael (1984) and Chambers and Pick (1994) . 7 We show that in this environment MQS imposed collectively by producers who make production decisions as perfect competitors create two types of deadweight losses. The loss from wastage of L product that is destroyed or diverted to secondary markets is well known (e.g., Bockstael 1984) . 8 The second loss, which stems from inefficient enhancement of quality from L product to H, has not previously been explicated. Our results that MQS enacted in competitive industries necessarily harm consumers and net welfare are consistent with Bockstael's conclusions, but the greater structure imposed on the present model, coupled with explicit consideration of the producer adoption decision within a two-stage model framework, enable us to obtain several additional insights in terms of characterizing the welfare impacts of MQS, identifying the types of industries where MQS will be imposed, and comparing the welfare impacts of MQS relative volume-control policies.
Specifically, we obtain closed-form solutions for the impacts of a MQS on price and production of the high-quality product and welfare of producers and consumers. These overall impacts are de-composed and cast in the framework of second-degree price discrimination, enabling a full characterization of the manner in which a MQS impacts market equilibrium and the welfare of producers and consumers. This framework enables us to derive new results regarding types of industry settings wherein MQS will be imposed by profit-maximizing producer organizations and to characterize relative magnitudes of welfare impacts. For example, producers are unlikely to voluntarily impose a MQS in industries where quality enhancement is relatively easy and, thus, 7 The key reference on the effects of MQS in the asymmetric-information case is the seminal paper by Leland (1979) . 8 However, this loss is absent in the general economics literature on MQS, because once a standard is set in place, manufacturers never produce a product that fails to meet the standard.
wastage of production due to a MQS is minimized, because the additional production of high-quality product stimulated by a MQS will adversely affect its price and offset the benefit gained by eliminating consumer self selection. Further, in the limiting case when quality enhancement is not possible, producers' adoption decision does not depend upon the relative quality of low-quality product that would be precluded from sale under a standard, leading to cases when MQS will be imposed at a high cost to consumers and society.
However, mandatory marketing programs are designed to benefit producers and their existence reflects a willingness on the part of policymakers to accept some social loss if the programs succeed in increasing farm income (French 1982; Gardner 1983) . Thus, conclusions about direction of impacts on consumers and net welfare, although useful, are largely irrelevant to the overarching question of whether and when MQS can and should pay a role as a policy tool to enhance producer incomes. Lence et al. (2007) argue that delegating cartel powers to producer organizations can enhance overall welfare because new, geographically differentiated products introduced through producer organizations may increase social welfare yet fail to achieve commercial viability in a competitive market because the income stream is insufficient to recover the fixed costs of developing and marketing the product. Thus, market interventions that increase producer income can facilitate adoption of new products and improve net welfare.
We contribute to this policy discussion by showing that MQS can be an effective incometransfer policy tool relative to a supply-control program recommended, for example, by Lence et al. (2007) . Specifically, a MQS can be effective in raising producer incomes in market settings where supply controls are ineffective. When both programs can accomplish the same income transfer, the MQS may be able to accomplish the transfer at a lower deadweight loss than volume control. Thus, our policy conclusions are considerably more sanguine towards MQS than Bockstael's.
The Model Setup
We consider a vertically differentiated commodity which can either be high-quality (H) or lowquality (L), where consumers always prefer H over L. The quality level of the H product is normalized to 1.0, and the quality of the L product is 1 ! < , and, hence, ! is the relative quality level of the L product. The assumption of exogenous quality levels is a common and realistic simplification for agricultural products, and may hold literally in instances when quality designations are based upon standards set by government or by the producer organization itself, and buyers utilize those standards as proxies for true quality.
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Total output, X, is exogenous (e.g., it is based upon prior planting decisions). Costs of producing output are thus sunk and do not enter into the analysis. In many settings producers are able to undertake activities to increase the proportion of a given crop that is high quality by, for example, applying pesticides or fungicides to reduce damage, thinning fruit to increase size, pruning to reduce canopy and improve fruit color, and delaying harvest to increase ripeness. A common approach is to depict such behavior through a damage function, wherein crop damage is specified as a function of damage-control activities, such as application of pesticides, and other factors (e.g., . We adopt a somewhat different but ultimately equivalent approach. We specify an exogenous "ex ante" share of total output, 0 < ! < 1, that would low quality without any damage-mitigation or quality-enhancement efforts. Thus, the ex ante amounts of H and L product are (1 ! " ) X and ! X , respectively. 10 We then assume that product that would be L in the absence of damage-mitigating or quality-enhancing activities can be improved in quality or "transformed" by the industry into H product through a decreasing-returns technology.
Consistent with the contemporary literature on costs due to augmenting product quality (e.g., Ronnen 1991; Ecchia and Lambertini 1997; Maxwell; 1998; Valletti 2000; Zhou, Spencer, and Vertinsky 2002), we represent this technology at the industry level in terms of a quadratic "transformation cost function":
(1)
where T ![0," X ] is the amount of L product transformed to H, and ! , 0 < ! " # , is a parameter that calibrates the marginal cost of quality enhancement. For example, ! would depend upon the nature of the product and availability, productivity, and cost of quality-enhancing inputs, such as pesticides and fungicides, and other complementary inputs, such as labor. We establish formally the link from this approach to the literature on damage abatement in appendix A.
Following Mussa and Rosen (1978) , there is a continuum of consumers in the market who are indexed by a taste parameter for quality, !, and who are uniformly distributed on [0, 1] with density, D, normalized to 1.0. Each consumer derives utility from only the first unit of the commodity that she purchases. A consumer with taste parameter ! has utility ( , ) U! ! = and surplus
consuming a unit of the L product, where P represents the price of the H product and p represents the price of the L product. Based on these utility functions, we can identify a type of demand function for each product based solely upon consumers' willingness to pay for the H and L products in isolation. These functions express the individual rationality (IR) condition that no consumer will purchase a product that yields her negative net utility:
These functions lack much significance when both the H and L products are on the market, but they are important in this paper because we are studying the implications of eliminating the L product from the market through a MQS.
When no MQS is imposed, consumers can choose freely between the H and L products and may also elect to consume neither. This aspect of self selection constrains pricing for the H product in a way that may make it advantageous for an industry to impose a MQS. To study consumer choice in the Mussa-Rosen framework, note that the consumer who is indifferent between consuming the H product and the L product is represented by taste parameter
indifferent between consuming the L product and not consuming the product at all is represented
. Note that in general the condition determining the location of ! ! 0 is a self-selection condition in the sense that this consumer is indifferent between consuming H and L product and obtains positive surplus from either choice: The respective demands for the H and L products that account for the presence of both products on the market and consumers' ability to choose are:
Inverting the system of equations comprised of (3) and (4) results in the indirect demand functions:
Substituting for Q H and Q L in (5) and (6) with the equations linking consumption to the available
It is assumed throughout that the potential demand for the commodity exceeds the sum of the exogenous output, which implies X < 1, given that the total number of consumers in the market is normalized to 1.0. Thus, X has the interpretation of the product's market penetration, i.e., the share of consumers who purchase the product in the no-MQS equilibrium.
Equilibrium
The two-stage model is solved recursively. Stage 2 involves production and price setting, and equilibrium must be determined both when a MQS is imposed and when no MQS is imposed. Stage 1 is the industry's decision whether to impose a MQS.
Stage 2: Prices and Production in the Absence of the MQS
To derive the supply function for quality enhancement, differentiate the industry transformation cost function (1) to obtain the direct marginal transformation cost function, MC(T ) = !T . Quality enhancement also involves an indirect or opportunity cost in the no-MQS case (denoted by superscript 0) because each unit of L that is transformed to H cannot be sold as L at price p(!, X ) .
Thus, the full marginal cost of transformation in the no-MQS case is !T + p(", X ) . The competitive market optimum for transformation, T 0 , is then determined by the condition
is the price premium earned for selling H rather than L product. However, transformation of L product to H is limited by the ex ante availability, , X ! of L product. To take account of this limitation, we find the level of price
! p) such that the total available quantity of L product is transformed to H by solving
Therefore, the market supply of quality enhancement in the no-MQS case is
Substituting (5') for P 0 and (6') for p into (7) Limiting attention to this case, the equilibrium volume of transformation under perfect competition in the no-MQS case is: Prices for the H and L products in the no-MQS competitive equilibrium are 11 The self-selection constraint requires that for any quantity in the interval [(1 ) , ] ! X X " , the vertical distance between the IR demand for the H product, segment 1m, and segment nm be identical to the vertical distance between willingness to pay for the L product, segment a ! , and the price for L product, A p .
Stage 2: Prices and Production in the Presence of the MQS
Imposition of a MQS that removes L product from the market causes two effects: first, consumers
are not able to substitute between the L and H products, eliminating the self-selection constraint on the market. Instead the equilibrium price for the H product is determined by the market-clearing or IR condition given in (2) that consumers are willing to purchase all H product produced either ex
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ante or through transformation. Second, transformation of L product to H no longer involves the opportunity cost of selling the product as L.
Denote as P 1 (!) the market's residual demand function to transform L product to H in the presence of the MQS. P 1 (!) is illustrated in figure 1 by the segment km, and analytically is determined from (2), given the amount of ex ante H production, (1 ! " ) X :
The market supply curve, T 1 (P 1 ), for transforming L product to H when the MQS is imposed is based solely on the direct marginal costs of transformation, !T , and is found by equating !T with P 1 and solving for T
In the presence of a MQS the competitive equilibrium price for H product, P A 1 , and amount of L product transformed, T A 1 , is found by solving (8) and (9) simultaneously. If (8) intersects (9) in its vertical portion, the entire amount of L product is transformed to H. This condition holds
Taking into account this consideration, the market equilibrium in the presence of the MQS is
The difference in the amount of product transformed in competitive equilibrium due to imposing a MQS is
Thus, more product is transformed to high quality when the MQS is imposed.
Proposition 2: Imposition of a MQS reduces social welfare in this model.
Given that T A 0 is the socially optimal amount of transformation from Proposition 1, the additional quality enhancement induced by the MQS is excessive from a societal point of view, and constitutes one source of welfare loss due to implementation of the MQS. 12 The second source results from producers' inability to sell and consumers' inability to consume the L product that is not transformed. At least one of these DWL will be strictly positive, confirming Proposition 2. The two deadweight losses are illustrated in figure 1 . The first source of DWL is represented by the triangle pdr while the second source of DWL is represented by the area ajgX.
Stage 1: The MQS Implementation Decision
The variable profits for producers in the no-MQS and MQS competitive equilibria are (10)
The industry will choose to impose a MQS if
To analyze conditions when it is in the industry's interest to impose a MQS, it is helpful to breakdown the overall impact on profit of a MQS into three component effects. The price effect is the change in revenue as a result of the MQS-induced change in price, P A 1 ! P A 0 , for H product that would have been produced and sold in the absence of the MQS, either through ex ante production,
The wastage effect is the revenue lost from L product that is not transformed and consequently is wasted under the MQS:
The wastage effect is negative whenever some L product cannot be sold and is wasted, and it is zero when the constraint on available L product to transform binds. The quality-enhancement effect is the change in revenue generated from the sale of the incremental H product created through transformation induced under the MQS:
. The profitability of the implementation of the MQS depends upon the sign of the sum of the three effects.
The price effect itself can usefully be broken into two components, one due to the elimination of the self-selection constraint and its replacement for pricing purposes by the willingness-to-pay or IR condition, and one due to the additional product transformed from L to H under the MQS. Define P * as the price that would result under the MQS regime, given the equilibrium amount of H product sold in the no-MQS regime:
. The total change in price due to the MQS can then be written as follows:
The component of the price effect due to eliminating self selection is P
and it is always positive. It is represented in figure 1 by the movement from point d on the no-MQS residual demand curve, nm, to the point s on the MQS residual demand curve, km. The component due to additional H supply created through transformation is P A
It is the movement along the MQS residual demand curve, km, from point s to point h in figure 1.
Because these components of the price effect offset, the overall sign of the price effect is in general ambiguous.
In general, the sign of the quality-enhancement effect is also ambiguous. A necessary but not sufficient condition for the effect to be positive is that Bockstael 1984) .
Proposition 3: A necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a profit-maximizing competitive industry to impose a MQS is
To see this result, consider the aforementioned three effects of the MQS on industry profits. 
Corollary: Any MQS implemented by a profit-maximizing competitive industry must induce wastage of the L product.
If T A 1 = ! X > 0 (no wastage), then it is necessarily true that the supply-effect component of the price effect dominates the self-selection effect, causing P to fall under a MQS (see figure 1) .
Consider now the effect of a MQS on consumers. Utilizing figure 1, it is possible to identify three specific groups of consumers: (i) those with taste parameters ! "[ ! ! 0 ,1] who purchase the H product both before and after the imposition of a MQS, (ii) consumers with taste parameters
who purchase L (H) product in the absence (presence) of a MQS, and (iii) those with
who buy the L product in the absence of a MQS and buy nothing in its presence.
Consumers in group (iii) are unambiguously harmed by any MQS, while consumers in group (i) benefit from a MQS if P falls and are harmed if P rises. The welfare effect on group (ii)
consumers is more complicated because their higher utility from consuming the H product is offset by the higher price they pay, P A 1 > p A . However, because consumers in this group could have purchased the H product at price P A 0 in the no-MQS scenario and did not, they cannot benefit from a MQS unless P A 1 < P A 0 .
Proposition 4: All consumers in the market who would purchase the product in a no-MQS competitive equilibrium lose from an industry-implemented MQS (Bockstael 1984).
Each group of consumers loses when P A 1 > P A 0 , but from Proposition 3, this is the necessary condition for producers to implement a MQS, thereby confirming Proposition 4.
The No-Transformation Case
Markets in this model are characterized by four parameters, X ,! ,", and ! . The first three range in the unit interval, whereas ! can in principle take on any positive value. The model simplifies markedly for the limiting case when ! " # , i.e., when it is not possible to enhance the ex ante quality distribution. This case is relevant both for settings when quality enhancement is simply difficult to accomplish due to limitations on technology or quality characteristics that are immutable and for cases when producer organizations can control production practices, in addition to imposing other regulations such as MQS. Lence et al. (2007) and Mérel (2009) provide recent analyses of control of inputs and production practices by producer organizations, and give real-world examples. 13 As the subsequent simulation analysis demonstrates, quality enhancement activities by competitive farmers limit the opportunity of producer organizations to implement profit-enhancing MQS. Thus, the joint imposition of a MQS and rules to limit quality enhancement can represent complementary policies to enhance producer profits.
The change in producer profit from enacting a MQS for the no-quality-enhancement case can be expressed as lim
Notably, although ! affects the magnitude of !" A , its sign is determined solely by! and X. Higher ! increases the value of the L product for any values of X and! , making the wastage effect from a MQS greater, but it also "tightens" the self-selection constraint and, thus, induces a greater price effect benefit from eliminating self selection by imposing a MQS. The two effects exactly counterbalance in the notransformation case.
The isoprofit curve in figure 2 identifies the (X, ! ) combinations that equate producer variable profits in the MQS and no-MQS scenarios for the no-transformation case. For (X,! ) combinations to the right of the isoprofit curve, !" A > 0 , and it is optimal for producers to impose a MQS, whereas !" A < 0 for parameter combinations above the contour, and the MQS is not optimal to 13 A concrete example would be a GDAP organization that set a MQS based upon a standard for pest damage and also imposed limits on application of pesticides.
implement from the industry's perspective. Thus, industries are more likely to impose the MQS when market penetration, X, is high and when the proportion of L product is low. Large X implies that p A ( X ) is low, making the negative wastage effect small. The positive price effect is large when the volume of H product, (1 ! " ) X , to which the price change is applied is large.
Larger values of X and smaller values of ! are associated with less elastic demands for the H product in the Mussa-Rosen framework; 14 the IR demand for the H product from (2) is inelastic for
Thus, one way to think of the preceding results is in terms of the well-known rule that a given increase in price has a larger impact on revenue the more inelastic the demand. The dotted line in figure 2 represents the contour of (X,! ) combinations such that H product demand is unitary elastic. All (X,! ) combinations to the right of the contour (the shaded area) represent inelastic demands for the H product, and this set of markets is wholly contained within the set where !" A > 0 , so in the exogenous-quality case, the industry will impose a MQS in all settings, as well as others, when demand for the H product is inelastic.
The deadweight (social) loss (DWL) associated with the imposition of the MQS in the exogenous quality scenario is due exclusively to product wastage-the sum of the surplus loss for L product consumers and the loss of seller revenue associated with elimination of the sale of the L product:
Although the relative quality of the L product does not enter into producers' adoption decision in the exogenous-quality case, the DWL from imposing the MQS is in direct proportion to! . Thus, 14 This relationship between demand elasticity and quantity sold holds for a very broad class of demand functions.
producers will impose a MQS without regard to the quality level of the product they are destroying or diverting, causing a large social loss when ! is high.
Figure 2. Isoprofit Contour in the Exogenous-Quality Scenario
Incorporating ability for producers to transform L product to H affects the desirability of imposing a MQS from the producers' collective perspective. Transformation reduces the profits lost from a MQS due to product wastage, but the additional H supply generated through transformation also diminishes the benefits gained from eliminating self selection. Given the extremely wide range of market conditions that can be depicted by admissible values for the four market parameters, X ,! ,", and ! , and the offsetting effects of transformation on producer profits, it does not seem possible to derive fully general results. We turn instead to a simulation framework to examine the impacts of producer-imposed MQS for reasonable values of the market parameters and also to compare the relative performance of MQS and volume controls at transferring surplus to producers.
Simulation Analysis
The conceptual model consists of four variables: 0 < X < 1, market penetration of the product; 0 < ! < 1, ex ante share of the product that is low quality; 0 < ! < 1, relative quality of the low-quality product; and ! , transformation or quality-enhancement cost parameter. As described in appendix A, ! can be linked to a damage-control function, in which case its value is determined by two new parameters, w, the unit price of the damage-control input and ! , the productivity parameter for the damage-control input, in addition to X and ! , i.e., !(w," # , X ) . The market penetration rate, X, was linked to the price elasticity of demand, ! , for the high-quality commodity (see appendix B) and, for given values of ! and ! , specified as X (! " ,# ) , with ! set alternatively at -0.5 (inelastic demand), -1.0 (unitary elastic demand), or -2.0 (elastic demand), based upon the range of relevant elasticity estimates observed in the literature. Finally, given each combination of {! ,", X (# ! ," )}, we specified a "low", "medium", and "high" value for ! such that at (50) [25] percent of the ex ante L product was transformed to H in the no-MQS competitive equilibrium. In addition, in accord with the prior discussion, the no-transformation case ( ! " ) was also simulated. In total, these variable choices yield 504 different markets to be simulated.
Surplus Transfer under MQS versus Supply Control
A MQS imposed by a profit-maximizing producer organization necessarily reduces the welfare of all consumers of the product and causes a reduction in net welfare in the competitive markets case.
However, interventions in agricultural commodity markets, such as facilitating collective action of producers via the establishment of marketing orders and related producer organizations, have been authorized by many governments as tools to transfer surplus to producers from consumers despite the DWL and costs associated with their implementation (Gardner 1983 ). More recently similar tools have been suggested as devices to enable competitive producers to introduce socially valuable, differentiated products that would not be profitable due to fixed costs in a competitive equilibrium (Lence et al. 2007 ). However, it is beneficial to society to transfer this surplus in the most efficient way possible (Gardner 1983 ).
We utilize the simulation framework to ask whether a MQS can be effective as a policy tool to transfer income to producers in the sense of Gardner's criterion of minimizing the DWL from a given income transfer. Specifically, we compare a MQS to a supply-control program (SCP), which is also typically available to producers via the same authority that would permit a MQS. 16 The first question is whether a level of SC, defined by saleable product volume X SC < X , exists which achieves the same surplus transfer, and, second, when the first question is answered affirmatively, whether the supply control achieves the transfer at a lower social cost than the MQS. 
16 A SCP represents the primary substitute tool to compare with a MQS because the saleable volume can be placed under the collective control of producers. Other instruments of collective producer action, such as mandatory promotion programs, could be implemented in conjunction with either policy, not as a substitute for them. 17 We assume that a SC program affects both H and L product in the same proportion. Both "ex ante" and "ex post" SC programs were considered. An ex ante program removes product prior to any costly transformation taking place, and, thus, it is more efficient than an ex post program, which would cause diversion of some product that had been transformed from L to H. The ex ante versus ex post distinction did not affect results, and only the ex ante results are presented here.
where ! ! 1 defines the location of the consumer who is indifferent between consuming the H product and nothing at all in the MQS equilibrium, ! SC is the location of the consumer who is indifferent between consuming the L product and nothing in the SC equilibrium and ! ! SC is the location of the consumer who is indifferent between consuming the L and H products in the SC equilibrium. The MQS yields a higher level of consumer surplus than the SCP, as illustrated in the figure, for the market specified. Consistent with the analytical results, an inelastic demand for the H product is conducive to implementation of a profit-enhancing MQS. In 100 of 168 markets simulated in the inelastic-demand scenario, a MQS increased industry profits. These cases came almost exclusively from the ! high and ! " subcases, confirming the general rule that MQS-induced quality enhancement is detrimental to profitability because the increase in P induced by eliminating self selection is reduced or eliminated by transformation. Profitable implementation of a MQS for low ! scenarios is limited to simulations involving high ex ante amounts of L product. In these settings the implied value of X (! " ,# ) is very high, meaning that, from (6'), p A is very low, and the loss in revenue from product wastage is inconsequential. In 77 of these 100 cases, a SC program can also achieve the same profit increment increase achieved by a MQS. 18 In cases when both a SCP and a MQS can achieve the same profit increment, the ratio in brackets in the corresponding cell in table 1 reports the proportion of times that the SCP achieves the transfer at a lower deadweight cost than a MQS. In all but 18 of the 77 cases where a SCP can achieve the same surplus transfer, the SCP transfers the surplus more efficiently. The cases where a MQS works better are instructive-they represent cases where no quality enhancement occurs, and the deadweight loss from inefficient quality enhancement is zero. 
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Numbers in square brackets are the number of cases where SC transfers surplus more efficiently than a MQS out of the number of cases where SC is able to transfer equivalent surplus.
The unit-elastic demand case reveals a lower incidence of profit-enhancing MQS-44 out of 168 possible cases. The profit-enhancing markets come exclusively from the ! high and ! " cases for transformation cost. A SCP is generally ineffective at transferring surplus to producers in these cases, achieving the same surplus transfer as a profit-enhancing MQS in only 10 of the cases. SC is the more efficient surplus-transfer mechanism in only four of those cases. 19 The elastic-demand case reveals only 16 cases where a MQS increases profit among 168 considered. A SCP program is, not surprisingly, almost never effective in transferring profit in these scenarios.
Thus, when society chooses industry self-governance as a tool to transfer income to producers, a MQS may represent a valuable policy tool in the sense that it can transfer surplus to producers in settings where SC is ineffective, and in settings when either tool works, MQS may transfer surplus more efficiently than a SC. The simulation analysis also demonstrates the misleading nature of the view that MQS are simply indirect or hidden forms of supply control. The impact of a SCP program on consumer and net welfare is a direct function of the amount of product removed from the market, and, if the SCP is implemented ex post, it cannot benefit producers unless demand is price inelastic.
The benefit to producers from a MQS is not from removing product from the market per se. Rather, it is due to eliminating self selection-consumers' opportunity to substitute between H and L products. Thus, profit-enhancing MQS are found in both markets with elastic and inelastic demands.
Conclusions
This paper has studied the impacts of a MQS imposed by an agricultural industry under the auspices of marketing-order or related legislation. We developed a model that reflects the essential realities of 19 Note that the simulated demand elasticity is evaluated at the midpoint of the amount of transformation that is possible, i.e., 0.5 .
The equilibrium amount of transformation may be higher, making demand inelastic at the market equilibrium so that a SCP can be an effective tool to transfer surplus to farmers. agricultural production and that is grounded in the recent economics literature on MQS. In the perfect-information environment of this model, MQS enacted in a competitive market with endogenous quality enhancement can never enhance social welfare because in general a MQS creates two DWL-the familiar effect due to wastage of low-quality product that cannot be sold, and a heretofore unexplored effect due to excessive product transformation or quality enhancement. In many cases this latter social loss will be large relative to the loss from wastage of L product.
Further, the distributional effects of a MQS can be important as well. Any MQS that a competitive industry implements voluntarily based upon a profit criterion in the perfect-information setting will cause all consumers in the market to lose.
By recasting analysis of MQS in the framework of second-degree price discrimination we demonstrated that the common belief characterizing MQS as simply a "hidden" form of volume control is fundamentally incorrect. The benefit to a producer group from imposing a MQS lies in eliminating consumers' opportunity to substitute lower quality product for higher quality product and the discipline on pricing this ability imposes. However, based upon the corollary to Proposition 3, any MQS that an industry imposes voluntarily will always cause product wastage. Thus, arguments that might be used to support an MQS in a competitive industry, namely that it will not cause product wastage and lead to beneficial quality enhancement are incorrect, the latter result being due to Proposition 2.
Our model and the simulation analysis are also useful in characterizing the types of industries where imposing a MQS is beneficial from producers' perspective. When the ex ante quality distribution is immutable, we showed that all cases of inelastic demand, as well as others, supported imposition of a MQS. Notably the industry decision did not depend upon the relative quality of the low-quality product, meaning MQS may be imposed in settings when relatively valuable "low-quality product" is destroyed and social losses from the MQS are correspondingly large. While the ability to transform low-quality product to high quality enables an industry to reduce costs from product wastage, quality enhancement in most cases is not beneficial from the perspective of producers' because the supply effect from additional high-quality product offsets the positive price effect from eliminating consumers' self selection.
Finally, the simulation analysis demonstrated that MQS may represent a "second-best" policy tool to transfer market surplus from consumers to producers in settings where supply controls are ineffective or generate large deadweight losses. In this regard, Bockstael's conclusion (1984, p. 471) that MQS persist because they fool consumers as to their impacts relative to overt tools such as tariffs and supply controls is too harsh. They deserve a place in the toolkit of policy alternatives when it is desirable to transfer surplus to competitive producers through self governance for social reasons or to give producers incentive to make socially desirable fixed investments that would otherwise be unprofitable.
Appendix A Conceptual Foundation for the Transformation Cost Function
In this appendix, we establish the link between the transformation cost function specified in (1) and the literature on damage control. We follow the framework established by Babcock, Lichtenberg, and Zilberman (BLZ, 1992) , who estimated the impact of insecticides and fungicides on product quality, with application to apple production in North Carolina. The proportion of the harvest that is damaged (e.g., by pests or fungi) in the absence of any damage control is = D ! .
The proportion of production transformed from L to H through application of damage-control inputs is t ![0," ] . BLZ assume that the logistic function is an appropriate representation of the damage equation. Considering the application of one damage-control input, Z, the damage function is (A1)
In the absence of the use of the damage-control agent (Z=0), D = ! enabling us to link the parameter b in (A1) to ! as follows:
The proportion, t, of low-quality product transformed to H is the difference between! and the actual damage, D. Thus, the proportion of product transformed is
where t is increasing in the amount of the damage-control agent applied whenever 0 < ! . For relatively intense levels of damage abatement, the percentage of production transformed approaches asymptotically the ex ante level of L product, ! .
Solving (A3) for Z yields the conditional input demand function for the damage-control input:
) .
Thus, the total variable cost function associated with transformation is the conditional input demand, ( , ) Z t ! " , multiplied by unit price, w, for Z: ( , , ) ( , ) = c t w wZ t ! " ! " . The marginal cost function for transformation is
. Figure A1 depicts representative marginal cost curves for various levels of ! , given ! = "0.0119 --the estimate from BLZ for fungicide application to North Carolina apples. The larger the amount of ex ante L product,! , the lower the intercept of the logistic marginal cost function. The smaller is ! in absolute value, the higher the marginal costs associated with all levels of transformation.
Figure A1. Logistic Marginal Cost Curves for Different Levels of Ex Ante L Product
Equation (A5) is not convenient for analytical modeling but can be approximated by a Taylorseries approximation. A first-order expansion of (A5) around point t = 0.5! yields
Finally, we recover the marginal transformation cost function, (1)) utilized in the model by first setting the intercept term in (A6) to zero for simplicity, second setting = T tX to recognize the link between t and total product transformed, T, and, then solving for
Thus, ! is a function of the base model variables, X and ! , the effectiveness, ! , of the damagecontrol input and its price, w.
Appendix B Notes on Parameterizations for the Simulation Model 20
This appendix discusses choices of reasonable values for each of the four model parameters in terms of structuring the simulation analysis.
Ex ante share of the product that is low quality: ! ranges in the unit interval. However, it is not often observed in the real world because the observed distributions across quality types reflect quality-enhancement decisions that were made. An exception is when field trials are available. For example, reports worm damage in processing tomatoes of less than 10%, i.e., 0.1 < ! , in field trials when no damage control was implemented.
! should be simulated over a wide range of values given the variety of crops and types of "damage" to which the model can apply. Starbird considered rather low levels of worm infestation in processing tomatoes under no damage control, ranging from 0.05 -0.15. However, Mazor and Erez (2004) find infestation rates in apples and nectarines as large as 0.625 and the incidence of overripe fruit resulting from pest attacks in persimmons to be in excess of 0.2. Furthermore, in an entirely different context of application, the share of small or discolored fruit in the absence of damage-control activities such as pruning, thinning, and/or green drops is likely quite high-half or more of the crop. Thus, we simulated ! in intervals of 0.1 for ! "[0.05,0.65] to account properly for the wide range of crops and dimensions of product quality to which the model can apply.
Relative quality of the low-quality product: ! also ranges in the unit interval and in general is not observed directly in actual market settings. We inferred a range of reasonable values for 20 Note to reviewers: Our intent is not to include this appendix as part of any published version of this paper. If the paper is published in AJAE, it might be made available as an on-line appendix.
each combination of ! and ! , we selected three values of !, -0.5, -1.0, and -2.0, evaluated at the midpoint of the possible range for T, i.e., 0.5 = T X ! , 22 and derived the implied value for X.
Transformation or quality-enhancement cost parameter: From appendix A, ! can be linked to the parameters of a damage-control function and expressed in terms of the productivity, ! , of the damage-control input, its price, w, ! , and X, i.e., ( , , , ) w X ! " # . To our knowledge estimates of ! for control of damage of product quality (as opposed to quantity or yield) are limited to study of insecticide and fungicide productivity in North Carolina apple production. specifies a range of parameters for the effectiveness of pesticides in reducing worm damage in tomatoes, but his choices are based upon assumption, not empirical evidence. Given the paucity of estimates of ! and our inability to use even the Babcock, Lichtenberg, and Zilberman estimates due to inability to resolve unit-ofmeasurement issues, the strategy was to simulate ! over a wide range of values to reflect the variety of products to which MQS might be applied and the wide range of types of "damage" that might compromise product quality. 23 Specifically, for each combination ( , , ) X ! " of the other model parameters, we chose low, medium, and high values of ! such that in the no-MQS equilibrium the industry would transform 75, 50, and 25 percent, respectively, of the available ex 22 The elasticity of demand varies continuously along the linear Mussa-Rosen demand curves, making choice of evaluation point necessary, and, in that context, choice of the median value for T seems reasonable. 23 A sense of the variation of ! in different real-world settings can be gleaned from the shares of crop revenue accruing to damage-control inputs. A compilation of cost-of-production studies by University of California Cooperative Extension for commodities with marketing orders reveals cross-commodity average revenue shares for insecticides and fungicides, respectively, of 0.0224 (standard deviation 0.0114) and 0.0176 (standard deviation 0.0164). However, shares for labor to improve fruit quality are much higher. For example, peaches intended for the fresh market are hand thinned to improve size and summer pruned to reduce canopy and improve color. Winter pruning is also largely done to improve fruit size. The combined labor cost for these three activities constitutes a revenue share of 0.171 for fresh-market peaches in the south San Joaquin Valley (Day et al. 2004 ).
ante L product. Given the point discussed in the main text regarding industries' ability to restrict transformation through input controls, we also simulated a no-transformation or ! " # scenario.
